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Abstract. We present new cryptographic protocols for multi-authority 
secret ballot elections that guarantee privacy, robustness, and univer-
sal verifiability. Application of some novel techniques, in particular the 
construction of witness hiding/indistinguishable protocols from Cramer, 
Damgard and Schoenma.kers, and the verifiable secret sharing scheme of 
Pedersen, reduce the work required by the voter or an authority to a 
linear number of cryptographic operations in the population size ( com-
pared to quadratic in previous schemes). Thus we get significantly closer 
to a practical election scheme. 
1 Introduction 
An electronic voting scheme is viewed as a set of protocols that allow a collection 
of voters to cast their votes, while enabling a collection of authorities to collect 
the votes, compute the final tally, and communicate the final tally that is checked 
by talliers. In the cryptographic literature on voting schemes, three important 
requirements are identified: 
Universal Verifiability ensures that any party, including a passive observer, 
can convince herself that the election is fair, i.e., that the published final tally is 
computed fairly from the ballots that were correctly cast. 
Privacy ensures that an individual vote will be kept secret from any (reasonably 
sized) coalition of parties that does not include the voter herself. 
Robustness ensures that the system can recover from the faulty behavior of 
any (reasonably sized) coalition of parties. 
The main contribution of this paper is to present an efficient voting scheme 
that satisfies universal verifiability, privacy and robustness. Central to our meth-
ods is the application of witness indistinguishable protocols from [CDS94] to 
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achieve greater simplicity and efficiency than previous voting schemes. The effi-
ciency of our schemes can be summarized as follows, when there are n authorities, 
m voters, and security parameter k. The total amount of communication will 
be 0( kmn) bits (posted to a "bulletin board"), while the required effort (in ele-
mentary operations) for any authority and any voter will be O(km) and O(kn) 
operations, respectively. For any threshold t :S n, privacy will be assured against 
coalitions that include at most t-1 authorities, and robustness against coalitions 
that includes at most n - t authorities. 
A fourth property recently stated is that of vote-duplication, i.e., one voter 
copying the vote of another voter without knowing the actual vote (see [SK95, 
Gen95]). There are various efficient ways to incorporate this property in the 
schemes we present. We will include a straightforward solution. 
1.1 Overview of the Approach 
The parties in a voting scheme are modelled as probabilistic polynomial time 
processes. Two means of communication are typically assumed to be available 
for these parties: 
A bulletin board, which is a broadcast channel with memory that can be 
observed and read by all parties. Each party controls her own section of the 
board in the sense that she can post messages exclusively to her own section, 
but not to the extent that she can erase or overwrite previously posted messages. 
Private channels to support private communication between voters and au-
thorities. For this task any secure public-key encryption scheme is suitable, pos-
sibly using the bulletin board to post the corresponding encryptions. 
The parties of the voting scheme perform the following steps to execute an 
election. To cast a vote, each voter constructs a ballot as an encryption of the 
desired vote, and posts the ballot to the bulletin board. At this point, a proof 
of validity is also required that convinces all parties that the posted encryption 
contains a valid vote, without revealing it. The authorities, however, are able 
to decrypt the ballots (because of extra information received from the voter 
through a.private channel). In the end, the final tally is published together with 
some auxiliary information to enable universal verifiability: any interested party 
(a tallier) may "accumulate" the encrypted votes and check the final tally, by 
holding it against this accumulation and the auxiliary information. 
More technically, universal verifiability is achieved by requiring the encryp-
tion function to be suitably homomorphic. At the same time a different security 
property of the encryption function, which is similar to the binding property 
of commitment schemes, ensures that the authority (assume momentarily to be 
a single entity) cannot accumulate the individual votes in any other way than 
the voters actually voted. Such homomorphic encryption schemes are available 
under a wide variety of common cryptographic assumptions. 
Central to our results is the way we achieve an efficient proof of validity for 
ballots. The proof of validity shows to any interested party that a ballot actually 
represents a vote, e.g., that it either represents a yes or a no, and nothing else. 
74 
To maintain privacy for the voters, the general idea is to use some sort of zero-
knowledge proof. The problem is however that zero-knowledge proofs usually 
require a large number of repetitions before the desired level of confidence is 
achieved. The efficiency of these proofs to a great extent influences the efficiency 
of the whole scheme, both in terms of computational effort and in terms of the 
required bandwidth for each voter. 
Our contribution now is twofold. We use a particular efficient homomorphic 
encryption scheme, based on the discrete logarithm problem (although, as we 
show, it can be based on other cryptographic assumptions as well). Moreover, by 
applying results from [CDS94], the proof of validity is a simple three-move pro-
tocol which is witness indistinguishable (in fact, witness hiding as well), instead 
of zero-knowledge as in previous schemes. This leads to a significant reduction 
of the effort required by the voter, from quadratic in the security parameter to 
linear, while still hiding the vote. 
Clearly, in the scenario above, the authority learns individual votes. This sit-
uation is alleviated by having multiple authorities instead of one. The encrypted 
vote is distributed over the authorities such that fewer than some number of 
authorities remain ignorant about individual votes. To make sure that the au-
thorities are convinced that the posted shares actually represent the vote cast, 
verifiable secret sharing is employed. Here, we apply Pedersen's scheme [Ped92], 
as it fits with the other primitives remarkably well. It is also by this method 
that robustness is achieved in the sense that only a subset (of a size larger than 
a certain threshold) of the authorities is required to participate throughout the 
execution of the scheme in order to compute the final tally. 
1.2 Related Work 
The type of voting schemes considered in this paper was first introduced and 
implemented in [CF85, BY86, Ben87b]. In these schemes, privacy and robustness 
are achieved by distributing the ballots over a number of tallying authorities, 
while still achieving universal verifiability. This contrasts with other approaches 
in which the ballots are submitted anonymously to guarantee privacy for the 
individual voters. Such schemes rely on the use of anonymous channels [Cha81], 
or even some form of blind signatures as in privacy-protecting payment systems 
(see, e.g., [Che94]) to achieve privacy. For these approaches it seems difficult 
however to attain all desired properties, and still achieve high performance and 
provable security. 
The voting schemes of [CF85, BY86, Ben87b] rely on an r-th residuosity 
assumption. In [SK94] it is shown that such schemes can also be based on a 
discrete logarithm assumption (without fully addressing robustness, though), 
and how this leads to considerable efficiency improvements. In the present paper 
we will also address various number-theoretic assumptions. 
As with our result, the efficiency improvement in [SK94] is mainly due to 
an improved zero-knowledge protocol to show validity of ballots. As noted by 
Benaloh, such cryptographic capsules [Ben87a, Ben87b] are at the heart of the 
problem of electronic elections and also useful for other applications. We note 
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that the technique of [CDS94] can also be used to obtain efficient solutions for 
group signatures (see (CDS94, CP95]). 
2 Cryptographic Primitives 
2.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Let g = {Qk} be a family of groups of prime order such that the group operations 
can be performed efficiently, group elements can be efficiently sampled with 
uniform distribution and group membership as well as equality of group elements 
can be efficiently tested. Let Gen be a probabilistic polynomial time generator 
that on input 1 k outputs a description of a group G E gk (including the group 
order), and two random elements g, h from G. We say that the discrete logarithm 
problem for g is intractable (over Gen) if there is no probabilistic polynomial 
time algorithm that on input of G, g and has output by Gen(lk) can compute 
log9 h with non-negligible probability in k. 
Each family g for which it is reasonable to assume the intractability of the 
discrete logarithm problem is suitable for our purpose of constructing efficient 
and secure homomorphic encryption schemes with corresponding proofs of va-
lidity. A well-known family, however, is obtained by choosing large primes p and 
q at random such that q I p - 1; then G is the unique subgroup of order q in 
z;. The discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves over finite fields is also a 
candidate for implementation. 
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption with Efficient Proof of Validity 
Let Q be a family of groups of prime order, and generator Gen as above. Assume 
that the discrete logarithm problem for g is intractable. The encryption scheme 
below is obtained as an extension of Pedersen's commitment scheme (Ped92] 
with an efficient proof of validity. 
Initialization: The participants, or a designated subset of them, run Gen( I k) 
and obtain a group Gq of prime order q, and random group elements g and 
h. One way to do this honestly, is that the participants agree on a program for 
Gen first. Then they each run separately Gen(Ik) where the coinflips needed 
are selected mutually at random, either by observing a common source of 
physical randomness, or by executing some well-known cryptographic pro-
tocol suitable for this purpose. 
Encryption: A participant encrypts v E 7lq by choosing a: E 7l.q at random, and 
computing 
Opening: A participant can later open B by revealing both v and a:. A verifying 
party then checks whether B = g"'h", and accepts v as the encrypted value. 
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Voter 
v=l 
B.- g"'h 
a1 ...._ g"1 (Bh)-d1 
a2 ,__ gw2 
d2 ,__ c -di 
r2 +- W2 + 0td2 
v =-1 
B...._ g"' /h 
a1 ...._ 91))1 
a2 ,_ g'2 (B /h)-d2 
d1 +-C -d2 
r1 <-W1 +ad1 
Fig. 1. Encryption and Proof of Validity of Ballot B 
Verifier 
c 
Homomorphic Property: Encryption is homomorphic in the sense that, if B1 and 
B2 are encryptions of v1 and v2 , respectively, then B 1 B2 is an encryption 
of v1 + v2 mod q. In general, an encryption of any linear combination of V1 
and v2 can be obtained from B1 and B 2 ; in particular, the sign of v1 can be 
flipped by computing B11 . Note also that, e.g., B1 h encrypts V1 + l mod q. 
Proof of Validity: In our voting scheme to follow, it will be the case that a 
voter posts an encryption of a value v E {l, -1}. To demonstrate that the 
encrypted value is indeed in {1, -1}, without revealing it, the voter and the 
verifier execute the efficient proof of validity of Figure 1. This proof requires 
only a very small number of modular exponentiations. 
Theorem 1 Under the discrete logarithm assumption, the encryption scheme is 
binding in the sense that it is infeasible to open a given encryption in two different 
ways. Furthermore, the proof of validity is a convincing argument that a given 
encryption is indeed an encryption of a value from the set { 1, -1}, thereby not 
releasing any information about the actual value. 
Proof If any party is able to open an encryption B in two different ways, 
i.e., to present values a,v,cl,v' such that B = gahv = ga'hv' with a =f. a' and 
v f: v', it follows that log9 h = ~;-_"'~, which contradicts the discrete logarithm 
assumption. Furthermore, by the results of [CDS94], the protocol in Figure 1 
is a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge that the voter knows log9 Eh 
or log9 B / h; here, Schnorr's identification protocol [Sch91] is used as the basic 
77 
protocol in the construction of [CDS94]. Thus the verifier learns that the voter 
knows a and v E {l, -1} such that B = g°' hv, without obtaining any information 
about the actual value of v. o 
Note that it even follows that the proof of validity is witness hiding. 
Jumping ahead a little bit, envision that a voter posts an encryption of 
his vote and that all other participants must verify its validity. As depicted 
in Figure 1, a source of randomness is required in the program for the veri-
fier. For this purpose, one can use some unpredictable physical source of ran-
domness [CF85], or agree on mutually random bits by cryptographic means. 
A more practical way, however, making the protocol non-interactive, is to ap-
ply the well-known Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87]. Their idea is to compute the 
challenge in a three-move identification scheme as a hash value of the mes-
sage to be signed and the first message of the prover. So, let H be a suitable 
strong cryptographic hash function (thought of as a random oracle). In the 
non-interactive version of our proof of validity, the challenge c is computed as 
c = H(B, a1, a2)· The set of values d1, d2, ri and r2 is denoted proof(B). Given 
the values in proof(B), any participant can check the validity of B by verifying 
that di + d2 = H(B, gr 1 (Bh)-d 1 , gr2 (B jh)-d2 ). 
2.3 Verifiable Secret Sharing 
To achieve robustness efficiently, non-interactive verifiable secret sharing is em-
ployed. We use the scheme of Pedersen [Ped92], as it is based on discrete log-
arithms as well and fits nicely with our encryption scheme. Being information 
theoretically secure, this scheme also contributes to privacy in our multiple au-
thority scenario. 
3 Secret Ballot Election Scheme 
We now present our main result, a secret ballot election scheme satisfying pri-
vacy, universal verifiability and robustness. The participants in the election 
scheme are n authorities Ai, ... , An and m voters Vi, ... , Vm. Privacy and ro-
bustness are as follows. No collusion of fewer than t authorities can reveal an 
individual vote, while the election will be successful when at least t authori-
ties operate properly (1 :'.S t :'.S n). At the same time we incorporate a simple 
mechanism to postpone the decision on what to vote until the preparation of 
the election has been completed. In this way several elections can be prepared 
beforehand at the beginning of the year, say, and casting a vote in an election 
then boils down to publishing essentially one bit of information. 
Informally the scheme works as follows. Each voter V; prepares a vote by ran-
domly selecting a number bi in {l, -1}. The voter first encrypts bi by computing 
Bi = g°'' hb;, where ai E 71..q is chosen randomly, and posts Bi to the bulletin 
board. Subsequently, bi is considered as a secret which is to be shared among the 
authorities. We employ a verifiable secret sharing scheme to prevent voters from 
disrupting elections by sending false shares to authorities. The efficient scheme 
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by Pedersen (Ped92] is a perfect candidate as it applies exactly to the discrete 
log setting we are considering. The idea is thus to let the voter act as the dealer 
in Pedersen's scheme, sending a verifiable share of the secret bi to each authority 
using the proper private channels. The voter also posts proof( Bi) to the bulletin 
board to prove that Bi indeed encrypts a value in {1, -1}. Later, voter Vi may 
then cast a vote Vi E {l, -1} by publishing the value Si = bivi. In the end, the 
aggregate value T = I;:,1 Vi reduced modulo q such that -q/2 < T < q/2 rep-
resents the total number of yes-votes minus the total number of no-votes, hence 
the total number of yes-votes is (m + T)/2. For these numbers to be correct the 
obvious requirement is that m < q/2. 
We assume that the group Gq and the members g and h are generated as 
described in Section 2. In particular, it then follows that logg h is not known to 
any participant. 
Ballot Construction 
Each voter Vi prepares a masked vote bi E { 1, -1} in the following way. 
1. The voter chooses bi randomly from {l, -1}, and computes the ballot Bi= 
g0 ' hb', where ai is randomly chosen from Zq· The voter also computes 
proof(Bi)· Finally, the voter determines polynomials Gi and Hi, 
Gi(x) = ai + O:i1X + · · · + ai,t-1Xt-l 
Hi(x) =bi+ f3ilx + · · · + /3i,t-1Xt-1 , 
where the coefficients °'ii, f3il, 1 :::; l < t, are chosen at random from 71..q. Also, 
for these coefficients the voter computes the commitments Bil = g°'i1 hf3;i. 
2. The voter posts Bi, proof(B;), Bii, ... , Bi,t-l to the bulletin board. 
3. All participants verify whether ballot Bi is correctly formed by checking 
proof(Bi).5 
4. The voter sends the respective shares (aij, b;i) = (G;(j), H;(j)) to authority 
Ai, using a private channel. 
5. Each authority checks the received share ( aii, bii) by verifying that 
t-1 
ga;.; hb;; B II Bi' = i ii. 
l=l 
Vote Casting 
To cast a vote, Vi simply posts Si E {l, -1} such that v; = b;s; represents the 
desired vote. 
5 To prevent vote duplication, a bit string specific to voter Vi is also included in the 
input to the hash function 1f. in proof(B;). In case the proof of validity is done 
interactively, as depicted in Figure 1, this bit string could be incorporated in the 
challenge. 
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Tallying 
1. Each authority Aj posts the sum Sj = 2:~1 aijSi and the sub-tally T; = 
2:~1 bijSi· 
2. Each tallier checks the share ( Sj, Tj) posted by authority Aj by verifying 
that 
3. From t pairs (j, T;) that correspond to authorities for which the shares 
(Sj,Tj} are correct, each tallier can compute the final tally T from the for-
mula: 
T = L:T; II Y::-:' 
jEA IEA\{j} J 
where A denotes a set of t correct authorities. 
We assume (w.l.o.g.) that in a successful election the shares of every voter have 
been accepted by all authorities. That is, all verifications by the authorities in the 
last step of the ballot construction are successful. In case an authority receives 
a share that does not pass this step, the authority may post the share so that 
anybody can verify that the share is not correct and that it corresponds to the 
posted encryption of step 4 of the ballot construction. 
Theorem 2 Under the discrete logarithm assumption, our secret-ballot election 
scheme satisfies universal verifiability, robustness and privacy. 
Proof To prove universal verifiability first note that only correct ballots are 
counted on account of Theorem 1. Further, to prove that the final tally is correct, 
we reason as follows for each correct authority Aj. Let G(x) = 2:~1 s;Gi(x) 
and H(x) = 2:~1 SiHi(x). By the binding property6 of the encryptions Bi (see 
Section 2), we have: 
= gL::1 •;a;; hL::1 s;b;; 
= II~1 (ga•; hb;; )•; 
rrm (B IJt-1 Bi')•• = i=l i l=l ii . 
By the assumption that the verification in step 2 of the tallying protocol holds 
for (S;, Tj ), we thus have gG(j) hH(j} = g 8; hT;, which implies Sj = G(j) and 
T; = H(j) under the discrete logarithm assumption. As a consequence, the final 
tally T is indeed equal to H(O) and thus represents the result of the election 
6 The description of our scheme above assumes that the hash function in the Fiat-
Shamir style proof( Bi), behaves like a random-oracle. Instead of using this technique, 
the participants can get the necessary random bits as explained in Section 2, thus 
also removing the need for this extra assumption. 
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if the verification in step 2 of the tallying holds for at least t authorities. This 
deals with universal verifiability and robustness. The privacy property can easily 
be proved from the fact that the secret sharing scheme used and the proofs of 
validity (see Section 2) are information-theoretically secure. D 
Thus, fewer than t authorities do not obtain any information about individual 
votes, other than what can be derived from the final tally (and accounting for 
votes that have been revealed by individual voters). 
To summarize the performance of our scheme, we note the following. The hard 
operations are the modular exponentiations with full exponents (i.e., exponents 
of expected size lql). Counting these operations, we see that the work for each 
voter is 0(1) for the construction of the ballot (including the proof of validity) 
plus O(t) for the commitments for the verifiable secret sharing scheme. Each 
authority has to do O(m) work to check all the shares. So active participants do 
linear work. Finally, verification of the election (done only by interested talliers) 
requires O(m) work to check the ballots plus O(tlog2 t) multiplications to check 
the shares of the final tally. Note that the parties' work can all be done either 
before or after the casting of the votes. The actual election simply consists of 
every voter posting essentially one bit of information to the bulletin board. This 
represents essentially an improvement of two orders of magnitude over the best 
schemes known so far (assuming k = 100), and enables much of the work required 
to be done off-line. 
4 Extensions 
The ballots B we have worked with so far are basically of the form B = g(JI. h b, 
where b represents the (masked) vote. There are numerous ways to extend this 
form, which will be elaborated upon in forthcoming work. We sketch some of 
the ideas in this section. 
Parallel elections Several elections may be held at the same time by running 
several instances of the scheme from Section 3 in parallel. A possibly more effi-
cient approach to perform K elections in parallel is to use ballots B of the form 
B = gOI. hr1 • • • h ~K, where each vz denotes the intended vote for the l-th election. 
The scheme of Section 3 can be carried over easily to this setting by observing 
that the immediate generalization of Okamoto's variation of Schnorr's scheme 
[Oka93] can be used to prove knowledge of either logg,hi, ... ,h1_ 1 ,h1+1 , ... ,hK Bh1 or 
log9,h1 , ... ,h1_ 1 ,h1+i.- .. ,hKB/h1, for each l = 1, ... ,K. Again the technique from 
[CDS94] can be applied to hide which of the two is known. 
Multiway Elections In a multiway election each voter has to choose between 
a number of options. That is, if there are K options, the voter has to say yes 
to one of them and no to all of the others. (See also [BY86].) This is achieved 
efficiently through ballots of the same form as in a parallel election, with the 
additional requirement that L,~1 v1 = 1, if yes and no are represented by 1 and 
0 respectively. 
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An even more efficient way is to take B = g°'hM' to represent option l, where 
M is larger than the number of voters. The voter then proves knowledge of at 
least one of log9 B /h, log9 B /(hM), ... , log9 B /(hMK ), without revealing which. 
Note, however, that the number of options K is now bounded by approximately 
logM q. 
Batched Elections A drawback of the above solutions for parallel and multi-
way elections is that there is no mechanism to perform masked votes. An inter-
esting extension therefore is to consider batched elections, where the same ballot 
is used several times. So, with a ballot of the form Bi = g0 " h~" ... h~K, a voter 
can later post the numbers Si! such that Vil = bi!Sil represents the intended vote 
for the lth election, for l = 1, ... , K. Although this reveals the sums I:i ais;1, 
2::; bil s;1, ... , Li b;K Sil, for l = 1, ... , K, this is not a problem if the number of 
voters is sufficiently large. (Note that L; bi!Sil is the result of the l-th election.) 
Integer Votes Instead of requiring that votes are in {O, 1} say, it is a natural 
extension to consider votes in { 0, ... , N - l} for some integer N. This can be 
achieved directly by using 1-out-of-N proofs (see [CDS94]). Also, using the above 
approach for parallel elections, the bits b; can be assigned weights like 2i-l, and 
then we get integer votes with N = 2K. 
5 Alternative Number Theoretic Assumptions 
Under the RSA assumption and the factoring assumption we obtain voting 
schemes that are comparable in performance and functionality. Note, however, 
that the initialization of these schemes is more complicated than the initial-
ization of the discrete log based schemes, if it is required that the modulus is 
generated by multiple parties. 
Under the RSA assumption, we have the following scheme. We assume that 
a modulus N, which is the product of two large distinct primes, a prime v, with 
gcd(v, <f>(N)) = 1, and an element h of Z'fv are available to all parties. The RSA 
assumption then roughly states that it is infeasible to compute h11v mod N. For 
this setting we have the following efficient commitment scheme. To commit to 
a value m E Zv, the committer chooses a ER Z'fv, and reveals B = avhm. The 
commitment is opened by revealing a and m. 
In this setting we may directly apply the technique of [CDS94] to Guillou-
Quisquater's identification protocol [GQ88] to construct proofs of validity for 
ballots of the form B; = ai hb'. To extend this to a solution with multiple 
authorities, as in Section 3, we run into a problem as we have no matching 
verifiably secret sharing scheme. However, an efficient solution for then-out-of-
n case is possible. The idea is simply that the voter chooses shares a;j ER Z'fv, 
for j = 1, ... , n, and b;j ER Zv, for j = 2, ... , n, and sets a; = flj=l aij 
and b;1 = b; - I:j=2 bij· The ballot is then computed as B; = a'jhb' with a;= 
(IJj=1 a;j )h (L7=1 b;;) div v. The protocols of Section 3 are translated accordingly. 
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Similarly for the factoring assumption, these ideas apply to such encryption 
functions as a 24b mod N, where N is the product of two primes P = 3 (mod 8) 
and q = 7 (mod 8). 
6 Conclusion 
We have presented election schemes of provable security and practical efficiency. 
The computational and communication complexity are essentially linear, instead 
of quadratic as for previous schemes. Even with a large number of authorities 
liken= 10, a voter need not communicate more than approximately 10.000 bits 
of information to submit a vote, assuming that !PI = 512 bits and !qi = 160 bits 
for our discrete log scheme. (Note that the actual ballot plus its proof of validity 
require only 1152 bits.) Compare this, for instance, to [SK94) with in the order 
of a million bits per vote for the same level of security. 
A property of voting schemes, recently identified, that we did not consider in 
the present paper is that of non-coercibility [BT94). Non-coercibility ensures that 
no voter will obtain, as a result of an execution of the voting scheme, a receipt 
that can prove how she voted. The intention of this property is to prevent vote-
buying and other tactics of voter persuasion. It is possible (and is part of work 
in progress) that extensions of our ideas can give a scheme which incorporate 
non-coercibility while maintaining universal verifiability, privacy, robustness, and 
efficiency. 
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